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Do Opposites Attract? Educational Assortative Mating and Dynamics 
of Wage Homogamy in Switzerland, 1992–2014
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Abstract: This paper addresses homogamy and assortative mating in Switzerland.  The empiri-
cal analysis monitors trends for education and hourly wages using the Swiss Labour Force 
Survey and the Swiss Household Panel.  The analysis disentangles the effects of educational 
expansion from mating patterns and incorporates not only couples, but also singles.  Results 
show an increasing level of assortative mating both for education and for wages.  For wage 
homogamy, selection is more important than adaptation.
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Ziehen sich Gegensätze an? Bildungs- und Lohnhomogamie in der Schweiz und ihre 
Veränderung zwischen 1992 und 2014
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag thematisiert die Bildungs- und Lohnhomogamie bei der 
Partnerwahl in der Schweiz. Die empirische Analyse beschreibt die Veränderungen anhand 
der Daten der Arbeitskräfteerhebung und des Schweizer Haushalt-Panels. Die Analyse be-
rücksichtigt sowohl Paare als auch Singles und unterscheidet zwischen Auswirkungen der 
Bildungsexpansion und der Partnerwahl. Die Resultate zeigen eine Zunahme der positions-
gleichen Partnerwahl bei der Bildung und bei den Löhnen. Für die Lohnhomogamie sind 
Selektionseffekte stärker als Anpassungseffekte.
Schlüsselwörter: Bildungsexpansion, Homogamie, assortative mating, Lohnniveau, Kohabitation
Les opposés s’attirent-ils ? L’appariement sélectif selon le niveau l’éducation et les 
dynamiques d’homogamie de revenu en Suisse, 1992–2014
Résumé : Cet article porte sur l’homogamie et l’appariement sélectif en Suisse. L’analyse 
empirique s’appuie sur l’évolution des niveaux d’éducation et des salaires horaires à partir de 
l’Enquête suisse sur la population active et le Panel suisse de ménages. 
L’analyse distingue les effets de l’expansion scolaire des effets de l’appariement sélectif en incor-
porant les célibataires. Les résultats montrent un niveau croissant d’appariement sélectif selon 
le niveau d’éducation et les revenus. En outre, la sélection est plus importante que l’adaptation. 
Mots-clés : expansion scolaire, appariement sélectif, salaires horaires, homogamie, cohabitation 
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1 Introduction
Marrying someone similar to ourselves is a phenomenon that social scientists call 
assortative mating.  Assortative mating is based on one or more factors including eth-
nicity, parental background, religion, and migration status and results in homogamy. 
While absolute homogamy refers to the share of homogenous couples, assortative 
mating refers to a preference to choose a similar partner over other possible partners. 
At the societal level, assortative mating is used as an indicator of stratification and 
it can be seen as a form of group closure and of social immobility (Kalmijn 1998). 
In this paper, we focus on socio-economic aspects of assortative mating in 
Switzerland by analysing education and hourly wages.  Assortative mating can con-
tribute to the transmission of economic status (Kremer 1997; Chadwick and Solon 
2002; Black and Devereux 2011) and can be a potential driver of income inequality 
because societies in which similar earners intermarry are more unequal than those in 
which high earners marry low earners (Esping-Andersen 2007; Schwartz 2010; 2013). 
Education is an important factor that affects the social status of individuals and 
consequently the level of economic inequalities (Sweeney and Cancian 2004).  Due 
to educational expansion, the meaning of education and its role for mating patterns 
is likely to have changed over time (Blossfeld 2009; Schwartz and Mare 2005).  An 
example is the cliché of doctors who formerly married nurses and who are now more 
likely to marry other doctors (Esping-Andersen and Myles 2011).  The rising wage 
dispersion among graduates (Lemieux 2006; Budría and Telhado 2011) might also 
imply that the signalling effect of tertiary education in terms of earnings and social 
status has declined over time.  
The literature on assortative mating points to several issues to solve.  First, not 
only marital preferences, but also the probability of finding a partner in the first place 
needs to be considered (Breen and Salazar 2010).  The exclusion of singles from the 
analysis might therefore miss important changes in assortative mating.  Second, the 
distinction of educational levels is not sufficient to measure homogamy in socio-
economic status.1 For this reason, researchers should also investigate other relevant 
characteristics (Schwartz 2013).  Third, most papers on economic assortative mating 
analyse annual earnings, which are determined not only by hourly wage, but also 
by labour supply (Dribe and Nystedt 2013).  Because labour market participation 
and the number of hours worked is a joint decision within couples, annual earnings 
are problematic indicators for studying assortative mating (Pestel 2016; Frémeaux 
and Lefranc 2015).  Fourth, many women do not participate in the labour market 
and thus earn nothing.  Because labour force participation is related to the level of 
earnings, the omission of inactive individuals will induce bias.  Rich data are required 
1 For example, the detailed educational levels in the SHP (pooled sample 2000–2014) explain only 
15% of the variation of men’s hourly wages and 10% of the variation of men’s realised yearly 
earnings.  For women, the explained variances amount to 12 and 15 %, respectively.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/21/17 10:09 AM
Do Opposites Attract? 569
for a good imputation model of hourly wages.  Finally, it is difficult to disentangle 
to what extent earning differences between partners are due to selection into couples 
rather than to adaptation to the partner (Nakosteen et al. 2004). 
Our contribution addresses these issues and applies them to the Swiss case. 
We first assess the evolution of absolute homogamy and educational assortative mat-
ing using the Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992–2014 and then move to homogamy 
in hourly wages using the Swiss Household Panel 2000–2014.  To the best of our 
knowledge, information on homogamy in Switzerland remains scarce, outdated 
and limited to educational levels.  In this country, there has been considerable 
educational expansion, which increased the share of tertiary-educated individuals 
from 8% in 1992 to 27% in 2014 for working-age women and from 23% to 45% 
for working-age men.  Even though the educational expansion has been relatively 
slow in Switzerland, women in younger cohorts have meanwhile reached men in 
terms of education (Becker and Zangger 2013). 
Besides providing evidence on Switzerland, we contribute to the previous lit-
erature on the topic in two respects.  First, the use of panel data helps to distinguish 
effects from intra-couple decisions (adaptation) from effects from assortative mating 
(selection).  Second, we specifically model the relationship between educational 
homogamy and wage homogamy. 
This paper is organised as follows.  After presenting the theoretical framework 
(Section 2) and providing a literature review on the topic (Section 3), it describes 
the data and the methodology (Section 4) and the empirical results (Section 5).  Sec-
tion 6 concludes by highlighting the main results and discussing the consequences 
of assortative mating on inequalities more generally.  
2 Theoretical framework and previous literature
Figure 1 summarises the theoretical framework that will guide our analysis and 
illustrates the multiple connections between educational expansion, educational 
homogamy, and homogamy in hourly wages.  Even if not shown in the Figure, there 
might be differences between population groups.  We will now explain the different 
links in more detail.  We refer to homogamy as a similarity of partners with respect 
to the absolute level of education or wages.  Assortative mating reflects the prefer-
ence to choose a similar partner over other partners and thus relates to the ranking 
in education or in the wage distribution.
2.1 Assortative mating and education
There are many potential and mostly unconscious reasons why people tend to 
choose a similar partner and these reasons range from values and social expectations 
to overlapping social networks (Kalmijn 1998).  Regarding education, individuals 
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may choose a partner with the same educational level because they share the same 
interests, communicate in a similar way, or because they meet each other more 
frequently (e. g. at university or at the workplace).  In addition to these similarities, 
highly educated partners might be preferred because education is linked to higher 
income and ability.  The degree of educational assortative mating can be interpreted 
as the importance given to education in the selection of the partner.  
Educational expansion might affect educational homogamy through two dif-
ferent processes: by the alteration of the marginal distribution of educational levels 
and by the change in preferences for the suitable partner.  Even when preferences 
and mating patterns remain constant, more tertiary educated individuals translate 
into more couples in which both partners have a tertiary education degree.  The 
change in preferences is what interests us the most.  
There are different theories that claim that the role of education in the selection 
of the partner has changed over time.  The technical change hypothesis advanced by 
economists attributes a rising importance of education for mating patterns because 
skill-based technological change and deindustrialisation have lowered the demand 
for low-qualified labour and increased the demand for high-qualified labour.  Some 
commentators have concluded that these economic processes have deepened the earn-
ing differences between low and high-educated individuals (Förster 2000).  Similarly, 
the status attainment hypothesis used in sociology postulates that modernisation 
gives more importance to achieved characteristics such as education than to ascribed 
characteristics such as ethnicity or social origin (Schwartz 2013; Goode 1963). 
The conflict theory of Collins (1971) proposes another theoretical argument 
for the weakening importance of education in mating patterns.  If education is a 
positional good, educational expansion might reduce the signalling effect of tertiary 
education for high social status, prestige and cultural capital.  Having a tertiary educa-
tion has indeed another meaning for new generations than for older ones.  Prestige or 
cultural capital might no longer be the products of popular universities, but of few 
elitist institutions.  This means that stratification might have shifted from between 
Figure 1 Theoretical framework on the link between educational expansion,  
educational assortative mating and homogamy in hourly wages
Homogamy in 
hourly wagesDistribution of
education
Educational
expansion
Role of education
for mating patterns Homogamy in 
educational levels
Intra-couples
decisions
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/21/17 10:09 AM
Do Opposites Attract? 571
educational level to within tertiary education.  Several empirical studies confirm the 
role of education as a positional good (Trostel et al. 2002; Leuven et al. 2004).  If 
individuals do no longer distinguish themselves because of their educational level, 
this raises the question on whether education might be replaced or complemented 
by other signals for social status (Schwartz 2013). 
Theories taking into account the gender-bias in the educational expansion 
propose additional arguments.  Women’s changing role in society and employ-
ment has made them more similar to men in terms of social status and earnings. 
Gender asymmetries in mating preferences might have weakened in parallel.  In 
gender-traditional societies, women have incentives to choose a partner with a high 
educational level and good employment prospects (Brines 1994).  On the one hand, 
partner’s social status might have become less important for women because they 
have become more independent (Fernandez et al. 2005).  If this is the case, women 
should show a rising tendency to marry down and a lower tendency to marry up.  On 
the other hand, partner’s education and employment prospects might have become 
more relevant for men because their spouses contribute more strongly to household 
income.  This process would result in more assortative mating over time.  Some stud-
ies indeed find that women’s economic characteristics have become more important 
for assortative mating (Kalmijn 1994; Mare 1991; Sweeney and Cancian 2004).  
Overall, empirical studies show that educational homogamy is widespread 
(Blossfeld and Timm 2003), but trends over time differ and show mixed results (see 
also Blossfeld 2009 for a literature review on the topic).  Some contributions find 
that homophily2 (McPherson et al. 2001) and assortative mating have increased over 
time (Hou and Myles 2008 for Canada and the US).  Others register stable levels 
of assortative mating (Breen and Salazar 2011) or differences between countries 
(Kalmijn 1998).  Ultee and Luijkx (1990), Smits et al. (1998, 2000) and Hu and 
Qian (2016) explain country differences with the level of societal openness and 
development of the countries.  
Research about the Swiss situation is particularly scarce.  Schumacher and 
Lorenzetti (2005) document occupational homogamy between 1909 and 1928 in 
Winterthur and revealed particularly high levels among managers and unskilled 
factory workers.  Studies that use more recent survey data and three educational 
levels report 68% of homogamous couples in 1994 (Diekmann and Schmidheiny 
2001) and 63% in 2008 Bühlmann and Schmid Botkine (2012, 32–33).  Also us-
ing three educational levels, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO 2016, 59) 
registers 56% of couples with the same educational level in 1990, 55% in 2000 
and 58% in 2010–2014.
2 Homophily is the tendency of individuals to befriend with similar others.
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2.2 Assortative mating and wages
Homogamy in wages is closely related to educational homogamy.  Considering 
substantial returns to education (Balestra and Backes-Gellner 2017), homogamy 
in education should translate into homogamy in wages.  We therefore expect that 
couples with the same level of education are more homogenous in terms of wages 
compared to other couples.  There is wide empirical evidence of homogamy in earn-
ings (Zimmer 1996; Nakosteen et al. 2004).  In OECD countries, this homogamy 
has increased over time with 40% of all couples currently having similar earnings 
compared to only 33% in the 1990s (Keeley 2015).
An important difference between education and hourly wage is that the latter is 
less stable over time.  Winkler, McBride and Andrews (2005) identified that for 30% 
of educationally homogamous couples in the USA, wage advantages have alternated 
between the man and the woman over the life course.  Similarly, interpretations of 
wage homogamy need to take into account that not only assortative mating, but 
also the effects that occur after the formation of the couple influence the level of 
homogamy.  In particular, labour supply decisions and the division of tasks within 
couples alter wage homogamy over the duration of the relationship. 
3 Methods and data
We use data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) and the Swiss Household 
Panel (SHP).  The main advantages of the SLFS are the availability of data since 
1991 and the presence of new samples of considerable size every year.  Because the 
SLFS lacks information on partner’s income, we use data of the SHP for the analysis 
on hourly wages.  The SHP follows households on a yearly basis and includes three 
samples (SHP I since 1999, SHP II since 2004, SHP III since 2013).  Potential 
drawbacks are the limited sample size, the underrepresentation of immigrants and 
attrition (see Tillmann et al. 2016 for details).  To show the evolution over the longest 
time span available, we show results for 2000 and 2014 for the SHP and for 1992, 
2000 and 2014 for the SLFS.3 The sample is composed of cohabiting heterosexual 
couples of the main working age range (25–64).4 In the first part of the analysis, 
we also include singles into the sample to take into account the selection into 
partnership.5 People who are unable to work have been excluded from the analysis 
3 Due to data unreliability, we did not use data from the first year of data collection (1991 in the 
SLFS, 1999 in the SHP).
4 The sample of homosexual couples (8–33 per year) is too small to be analysed separately.  In ad-
dition to this, it is not possible to include this group in cross-tabulations that distinguish between 
men and women.
5 Individuals having a non-cohabiting partner are considered as singles (35% of all individuals 
living alone say they have a non-cohabiting partner).  Because these individuals might live with 
others, we do not refer to them as single households.
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and weights are used for descriptive statistics.  For the SLFS, the sample amounts 
to 13 170 households in 1992 and 57 604 households in 2014.  For the SHP, the 
sample amounts to 3 343 in 2000 and to 5 497 in 2014.
Previous literature on educational assortative mating has relied mostly on 
cross tabulations (Breen and Salzar 2010) and log-linear models (Ultee and Luijkx 
1990).  Studies on similarity in earnings use mostly correlations (Nakosteen et al. 
2004; Grotti and Scherer 2016).  As a way to control for factors that determine 
earnings (e. g. education, age, experience, region or disability status), researchers 
often use residuals from spouses’ wage regressions.  In this paper, we do not follow 
this approach for two reasons.  First, correlation coefficients are global measures, 
which cannot distinguish homogeneity at different points of the distribution (i. e. at 
the top or at the bottom of the distribution).  Second, potential selection effects are 
ignored because correlations cannot be computed for singles.  Third, it is complex 
to test how other factors influence wage homogamy, such as adaptation during the 
relationship or educational homogamy. 
To overcome this shortcoming, we propose an alternative empirical approach 
divided in three parts.  In the first part, we monitor educational assortative mat-
ing using cross-tabulations that consider three educational levels (lower secondary, 
upper secondary and tertiary)6 and distinguish singles and couples.  We apply the 
same method for hourly wages in the second part of the analysis and consider three 
different wage levels (lowest third, intermediate third, and highest third).  The 
approach is here slightly different because group sizes change over time for educa-
tion, but are constant by definition for wage levels.  In the third part, we look at 
homogamy in hourly wages in more detail using regression models.  This analysis 
has a double aim.  First, it shows the relation between educational homogamy and 
wage homogamy.  Second, it tests the effect of intra-couple decisions (adaptation) 
during the partnership. 
Hourly wages have been computed at the basis of monthly wages and weekly 
working hours.  Missing values have been imputed not only for all working individu-
als (13% of men and 15.8% of women participating in the individual interview), 
but also for non-active individuals (5.9% of men and 21% of women participating 
in individual interview) to estimate their earning capacity.  This is important to 
measure assortative mating independently from the individual decision to work or 
not.  The SHP provides a very good basis for such imputations because it includes 
information on earnings from other years and detailed information on the last job 
held by inactive individuals.  We used a sequential procedure for imputation.  If 
information on hourly wage of an individual was available in a previous wave, we 
used this former value taking account of inflation.  Among active individuals, such 
6 These classes correspond to ISCED 2A for lower secondary, ISCED 3A-C and 4A-C for upper 
secondary and ISCED 5A-B and ISCED 6 for tertiary education.  Unfortunately, finer distinc-
tions in educational levels are not possible for long-term comparisons with the SLFS data, which 
distinguishes between Bachelor and Master Degrees only starting from 2010.
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information was available in 51% of cases.  Among inactive individuals, we could use 
hourly wage from a previous interview in 29% of cases.  If no such information was 
available, we used information from the next wave (11% of individuals with missing 
hourly wage and 4% of inactive individuals).  The remaining missing information 
has been imputed using the iterative algorithm from “mi impute chained” in Stata 
for men and women separately.  The regression included many variables on the em-
ployment situation from the current or previous job (self-employment, ISCO code, 
hierarchical position, economic sector), as well as region, education, age, civil status, 
children, residence permit and fluency in national languages.  The mean observed 
hourly wage over all panel years is 40.4 CHF (standard deviation 21.1), the mean 
imputed hourly wage for inactive individuals is 33.7 CHF (standard deviation 18.8) 
and the mean imputed hourly wage for active individuals with missing information 
amounts to 38.9 CHF (standard deviation 20.5).  This confirms that individuals 
with a low wage potential are more likely to be inactive.  The R-squared for the 
imputation of hourly wage is 0.35 for men and 0.28 for women.  In addition to this, 
we have top-coded wages to 12 000 CHF per week to exclude implausible values.
4 Results
4.1 Educational expansion 1992–2014
Table 1 shows the proportions of women and men according to three educational 
levels in 1992, 2000 and 2014.  The proportion of tertiary educated women started 
from a low level (8% in 1992) and touched 27% in 2014, whereas the proportion 
of tertiary educated men departed from a much higher level (23% in 1992) and 
reached 47% in 2014.  Given this difference in starting levels, the proportion of 
tertiary educated women more than tripled over the years, whereas the proportion 
of tertiary educated men just doubled.  If we analyse relative growth, we can con-
clude that the educational expansion of the last twenty years was gender-biased with 
more women acquiring tertiary education.  However, if we look at absolute change 
in percentage points, we notice that the proportion of men with tertiary education 
increased by 23 percentage points, whereas the proportion of women only by 19. 
Absolute changes indicate an almost gender-neutral expansion.  It is important to 
remark that absolute changes are more independent from the cumulative effect of 
education over generations than relative changes.  We can therefore say that this 
large expansion changed the distribution of education for the entire population.  By 
2014, almost half of all men, independently from their age, had a tertiary educa-
tion degree, contrarily to less than one third of all women.  Table 1 illustrates how 
this important educational expansion happened mainly after 2000s.  From 1992 to 
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2000, the proportion of tertiary educated women and men increased by slightly more 
than 2 percentage points.  All the rest of the expansion happened after this period.7
4.2 Absolute educational homogamy
Homogamous couples are illustrated on the diagonal that corresponds to the inter-
section of equal educational levels.  We notice that due to educational expansion, 
homogamous couples in which both spouses have a tertiary education have increased 
strongly from around 3% of all household types in 1992 to almost 13% in 2014. 
As illustrated before, this increase has been much more pronounced in the 2000s 
than in the 1990s.  Although clearly decreasing, the predominant household type 
remains composed by upper-secondary educated couples (36% in 1992 and 27% 
in 2014).  Low educated couples, where both spouses have completed at best lower 
secondary education, compose only around 8% of all household types.  An additional 
analysis on socio-demographic characteristics (not shown in Table 1), reveals that 
7 Even if we report only three years, the expansion has been linear, but faster in the 1990s compared 
to the 2000s.
Table 1 Proportion of household types according to their educational levels, 
1992 and 2014
Women lower 
secondary
Women upper 
secondary
Women tertiary Single men Proportions 
of men
1992
Men lower secondary 7.86 4.54 0.28 1.03 15.19
Men upper secondary 12.96 36.15 2.27 4.51 61.93
Men tertiary 1.69 13.21 3.13 2.61 22.88
Single women 1.92 6.30 1.53 0.00  
Proportions of women 26.60 65.54 7.85  100.00
2000
Men lower secondary 8.49 4.11 0.29 0.95 15.51
Men upper secondary 9.36 36.11 2.54 5.08 59.47
Men tertiary 1.22 13.63 4.37 3.12 25.02
Single women 1.91 6.92 1.89 0.00  
Proportions of women 23.10 66.88 10.01  100.00
2014      
Men lower secondary 8.11 4.54 0.88 1.06 9.97
Men upper secondary 6.40 27.10 6.55 4.84 45.42
Men tertiary 1.46 12.47 12.66 4.76 44.60
Single women 1.07 4.38 3.72 0.00  
Proportions of women 19.07 54.28 26.65  100.00
Sources: Authors’ computations with the SLFS 1992 (N = 13 170), 2000 (N = 17 711) and 2014 (N = 57 604).
Notes: Missing women correspond to single men and vice versa for missing men. 
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migrants can be found mainly in tertiary educated couples (approximately 63% of 
these couples have at least one person with a foreign nationality) and among single 
low educated men (46% of all single low educated men).  Low educated women 
living alone have a rather different profile, as they are older than the average. 
Summing the percentages on the diagonal, we reckon that homogamous couples 
constitute 48% of all households in 2014, which is 1 percentage point higher than in 
1992.  Among couples only, we find 68% of homogamy, which is close to previous 
findings in Switzerland with survey data and three educational levels (Diekmann 
and Schmidheiny 2001; Bühlmann and Schmid Botkine 2012).  Women who marry 
up in terms of education, have become less frequent over time (from 28 to 20% of 
all household types), whereas women who marry down are almost symmetrically 
increasing (from 7% to 12% of all household types).  Turning to singles, we observe 
that the share of highly educated singles is slightly increasing, but the number of all 
singles has only augmented by 1 percentage point (from 18 to 19%).
The percentages presented in Table 1 refer to absolute homogamy and cannot 
be interpreted in terms of mating preferences (Liu and Lu 2006).  In particular, the 
increase in homogamy at the tertiary educational level could simply be a consequence 
of educational expansion rather than of changing mating patterns.  Similarly, there 
could be more tertiary educated singles because the chances of tertiary educated 
individuals to remain single have increased, or because there are more tertiary 
educated individuals in the population.  In the next section, we move to assortative 
mating to disentangle these two effects.  
4.3 Educational assortative mating
In order to properly isolate the effect of marital preferences from educational ex-
pansion, we display assortative mating, measured by relative frequencies (observed 
frequencies divided by expected frequencies) in Figure 2.  The expected frequency 
is a simulated distribution assuming a mating pattern that is random by education. 
The expected frequencies are proportionally adjusted to keep the (impossible) case 
where both women and men are single empty (structural zero).  If the relative prob-
ability is one, it means that the educational level of the partner is not related to 
couples formation.  If the relative probability is larger than one, a household type 
(e. g. a homogamous household) is overrepresented in comparison to independence 
of educational levels. 
Results show a strong overrepresentation of couples with the same educational level, 
in particular for low educated individuals.  Considering all homogenous couples 
according to a weighted average, we see that sorting on education has become more 
important over time.  The probability of having a partner with the same educational 
level relative to having a partner with a different educational level has risen from 
1.37 in 1992 to 1.54 in 2000 and to 1.74 in 2014.  For 1992, this means that the 
observed probability of having a partner with the same education is 37% higher 
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than it would be under a mating pattern that is independent from education.  There 
are however compensatory effects among educational levels.  The probability for 
assortative mating has declined for tertiary educated individuals (by 0.4 points), 
whereas it has increased for upper secondary educated (by 0.2 points) and for low 
educated (by almost 1 point) individuals.8 The overall increase of homogamy over 
time found in Table 1 can thus mostly be attributed to stronger assortative mat-
ing among low educated individuals rather than among university graduates.  The 
8 Literature on mobility often refers to odds ratios rather than to probabilities.  The odds ratio for 
low educated individuals to have a partner with the same education have increased from 5.7 in 
1992 to 10.7 in 2014 (relative to the probability to have a partner with another educational level 
or having no partners).  The odds ratio for individuals with upper secondary education to have 
a partner with the same educational level has increased from 1.5 to 2.4 and the odds ratios for 
tertiary educated individuals have increased only marginally from 3.3 to 3.5.  This method does 
not take into account the change in the marginal distribution of educational levels, which is the 
reason why the odds ratios for tertiary educated individuals do not decline.
Figure 2 Relative probability of single and couple household by education
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
2014
2000
Tertiary
Upper secondary
Lower secondary
Tertiary
Upper secondary
Lower secondary
Women upper secondary, Men lower
Women tertiary, Men lower
Men upper secondary, Women lower
Men tertiary, Women lower
Both same education
Both tertiary
Both upper secondary
Both lower secondary
Homogamous Couples
Heterogamous Couples
Single Men
Single Women
1992
Sources: Authors’ computations with the SLFS 1992 (N = 13 170), 2000 (N = 17 711), 2014 (N = 57 604). 
Notes: For each type of couple, probabilities higher (lower) than one indicated an overrepresentation (underrepresentation) 
with respect to independence of educational levels for couple formation.
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lower assortative mating among tertiary educated individuals does not necessarily 
reflect declining homophily, but might also be the result of tertiary education having 
become a large and heterogeneous group.  This process is unlikely to reflect posi-
tive mating preferences among low educated individuals (Smits 2003), but rather 
a segregation of a small disadvantaged group that has lower probabilities for social 
mobility through marriage.9
It is also interesting to look at the evolution in hypergamy and hypogamy. 
The fact that the probability for women to marry up has become less frequent and 
the probability for men to marry up (or women to marry down) more frequent 
suggests indeed that men’s and women’s preferences for partner’s education have 
become more similar over time.  Low educated individuals, however, are not more 
likely to remain single than what they were before.  On the contrary, they are less 
likely to form single households.  
Besides homogenous couples, tertiary educated singles are the only other 
household type that is overrepresented.  In particular, women with tertiary education 
are likely to form single households (relative probability of 1.44 in 2014 compared 
to 1.26 for men).  Interestingly, this tendency has declined over time, which could 
suggest a better reconciliation between work and family for highly educated women. 
The decline of single households could also be due to an increase in cohabitation 
patters.  Some decades ago, couples cohabitated only when they married.  Nowa-
days, cohabitation is more socially accepted before or as a substitute for marriage.
4.4 Assortative mating in hourly wages 2000–2014
To measure assortative mating in hourly wages, we use the samples from the SHP in 
2000 and 2014.  We distinguish three wage categories (low, intermediate and high 
wage) of equal size (tertiles) for women and men.10 Because the marginal distribution 
in the cross-tabulations remains stable over time (always 33.3%), we directly address 
relative probabilities for each category.  The cross tabulation presented in Figure 3 
illustrates that there is assortative mating in the lower third and in the upper third 
of the (hourly) wage distribution.  Moreover, assortative mating in each earning 
category has increased between 2000 and 2014.  Averaging over the three wage 
categories, the relative probability has risen from 1.11% to 1.24%.  Although lower 
than for educational groups, assortative mating is considerable, particularly because 
we are likely to underestimate its extent for two reasons.  One is that measurement 
errors in hourly wages are frequent and the other is that adaptation to the partner 
masks part of the effect.  Another interesting point in comparison to education is 
9 In 2014, this group was composed by 36% of migrants and the average age of the group was not 
significantly higher than for other groups.  This highlights that the segregation of this group is 
not likely to be linked to a generational or a migratory phenomenon.
10 For men, the cut-offs are at 34.4 CHF per hour and 47.2 CHF per hour in 2000 (34.2 CHF and 
46.8 CHF in 2014). For women, the cut-offs are at 25.8 CHF per hour and 36 CHF per hour 
in 2000 (26.6 CHF and 37.2 CHF in 2014).
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that assortative mating in earnings has not only increased in the lower part of the 
distribution, but to a similar extent also in the upper part.  The analysis using cor-
relation coefficients comes to a consistent conclusion (Kuhn and Ravazzini 2017). 
The rank-order correlation (Spearman correlation) is positive for hourly wages and 
increases slightly over time.  
In addition to assortative mating, wage levels are also associated with being 
single.  In particular, men with the lowest hourly wages have a considerably higher 
probability of being single (relative probability of 1.25 in 2014) than men with in-
termediate and high wages (relative probability of 0.88 and 0.77 in 2000).  Another 
interesting comparison is the gender differences over the two time points.  In 2000, 
the relationship between remaining single and the wage level was negative for men 
and positive for women.  Even if differences remain, by 2014, men and women 
have become more similar in this respect.  In particular, high earning women have 
become less likely to be single and high earning men more likely to be single.  
Figure 3 Relative probability of single and couple households by hourly wage
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
Tertiary
Upper secondary
Lower secondary
Tertiary
Upper secondary
Lower secondary
Women upper secondary, Men lower
Women tertiary, Men lower
Men upper secondary, Women lower
Men tertiary, Women lower
Both same
Both tertiary
Both upper secondary
Both lower secondary
Homogamous Couples
Heterogamous Couples
Single Men
Single Women
2014
2000
Sources: Authors’ computations with the SHP 2000 (N = 3 362), 2014 (N = 4 769).
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Even if these changes over time are interesting, we cannot interpret them in 
terms of assortative mating because of potential adaptation effects that occur during 
the relationship (most importantly through the division of labour).  For example, 
wage similarity might have increased over time because women and men pay more 
attention to wages (or wage potential) when choosing their partner, or because double 
earner couples with a similar wage progression for both spouses have become more 
frequent.  Additional analyses are thus needed to better disentangle these effects. 
4.5 The link between educational homogamy and wage homogamy
Having addressed homogamy and assortative mating in education and in hourly 
wages in the previous sections, we now look at whether there is a link between 
educational assortative mating and wage homogamy.  In contrast to the previous 
empirical analyses, we take couples as units of analysis and use the ratio of their 
hourly wage as dependent variable to measure homogamy.  We always divide the 
lower hourly wage by the higher average wage of the two partners, irrespectively of 
whether the woman or the man earns more per hour (in 74% of couples, the man 
has a higher hourly wage than his partner).  The value of this ratio ranges between 
0 and 1 (mean = 0.65, standard deviation = 0.21).  Therefore, positive coefficients 
in the regression model mean higher wage homogeneity and negative coefficients 
higher wage heterogeneity.  Note that this measure captures similarity in earnings 
(absolute position) rather than similarity in the wage distribution (relative position).11
We estimate two different models.  The first model is a pooled linear regres-
sion (OLS) with clustered standard errors to account for repeated observations per 
couple.12 The second model analyses only couples during their first year of cohabi-
tation.  The wage homogamy in this sub-population can then be interpreted as a 
result of assortative mating.  This is in line with Ultee, Dessens and Jansen (1988, 
113), who state that “what really counts as a test for assortative mating are data for 
occupation at time of marriage.”  We include the following variables in the regression 
models: education of the couple, age (three categories of men’s age), a binary variable 
indicating age homogamy (within 5 years), as well as duration of the partnership 
in the first model.13 Even though the models explain only a small part (3.8% and 
4.2%) of the variation in wage homogamy, they illustrate some interesting patterns.14
11 We are aware that the dependent variable has considerable measurement errors because of the 
ratio.  Although estimators are unbiased when measurement error is in the dependent variable, 
standard errors will be overestimated.  Some coefficients might therefore be insignificant even if 
there is a true underlying relationship.
12 We do not use individual fixed effect panel models because they cannot capture the effect of 
assortative mating and education, which are time-invariant for individuals.
13 Considering the measurement error and the limited number of observations in the second model, 
we did not include other control variables into the model.
14 These OLS models do not directly show the extent of wage homogamy.  To test whether age and 
education explain the relationship between partner’s hourly wages, we looked at correlations of 
predicted wages of men and women including their age, age squared and education.  For couples 
who just moved together, this correlation amounts to 0.09 with control variables compared to 
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The first model reveals that homogamy in education and homogamy in hourly 
wages are related.  Interestingly, the group with the most similar wages does not 
consist of couples with the same education, but of couples where only the woman 
has a tertiary education degree.  As this effect is significant also in the second model, 
we can interpret this in terms of assortative mating.  Tertiary educated women who 
choose a partner with a lower educational level tend to choose a partner with a 
relatively high wage level.  The same does not apply to tertiary educated men who 
choose a partner with a lower educational level.  The large wage-gap of these couples 
can be explained by a traditional division of labour rather than by a low wage level 
when the partners moved together.  This interpretation is based on the fact that 
this effect is significant in the first, but not in the second model.  The hypothesis 
that says that educational homogamy is related to homogamy in hourly wage is 
therefore supported only in comparison to couples where women marry up, but 
0.15 without controls.  For all couples, the correlation amounts to 0.07 with control variables and 
to 0.11 without control variables.  This shows that sorting on wage levels is not just a by-product 
of education and age.
Table 2 Panel regression models on ratio of hourly wage within couples, 
1999–2014
Model 1 Model 2
Education 
Both lower secondary (ref.) 0 – 0 –
Both upper secondary –0.009 (–0.94) 0.042 (1.25)
Both tertiary 0.008 (0.77) 0.037 (1.08)
Men tertiary, Women  lower –0.063** (–6.34) 0.008 (0.24)
Men upper secondary, Women lower –0.033** (–3.05) –0.020 (–0.50)
Women tertiary, Men lower 0.029** (2.62) 0.071* (2.03)
Women upper secondary, Men lower 0.020 (1.55) 0.014 (0.34)
Age
Man 25–38 years (ref.) 0 – 0 –
Man 39–52 years –0.034** (–7.19) –0.047** (–3.67)
Man 53–64 years –0.036** (–5.24) –0.048** (–2.64)
Women of similar age (within 5 years) 0.014** (2.62) 0.032** (2.74)
Partnership duration –0.002** (–7.06)
Constant 0.722** (69.29) 0.662** (19.35)
Observations 36 726 1 315
R2 0.038 0.042
Sources: Authors’ computations with the SHP 1999–2014. Notes: The dependent variable is defined as the lower hourly wage 
divided by the higher hourly wave of the two partners; T-statistics in parentheses **, * indicate significant coefficients at the 
5% and at the 1% level respectively. 
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not in comparison to couples where women marry down.  Furthermore, there is no 
significant difference by educational level among educationally homogamous couples. 
Apart from education, also age plays a role for wage homogamy in general 
and homogamy during the first year of cohabitation (as age effects are significant in 
both models).  Younger couples have more similar hourly wages than older couples.15 
Whether this is a life-cycle or a cohort effect has to remain open.  What is clear is 
that wage homogamy is increased by age homogamy.  
Finally, the first model includes the duration of the relationship and reveals a 
divergence of wage homogamy of 0.2 points per year of partnership.  Wages of partners 
are thus most similar when they meet and then diverge over time.  Possible reasons 
for this are divergent career-path due to the division of labour.  The negative effect 
of adaptation on wage homogamy is an important point to note because it suggests 
that observed wage homogeneity is the result of assortative mating (or selection), 
rather than of adaptation.  The effect of assortative mating on wage homogamy is 
therefore stronger than what is suggested in Figure 3. 
5 Conclusions 
This study broaches the subject of socio-economic assortative mating in the context 
of educational expansion.  The Swiss Labour Force Survey is used to assess the evo-
lution of educational homogamy and assortative mating and the Swiss Household 
Panel is used to analyse assortative mating in earnings capacities within couples. 
Results show increasing assortative mating both for educational levels from 1991 
to 2014 and for wages homogamy from 2000 to 2014.  Looking more in detail, 
we see compensatory effects between people with different educational levels.  The 
share of tertiary educated couples among all households has sharply increased from 
3% in 1992 to 13% in 2014, whereas the probability of an individual with tertiary 
education to be with a tertiary educated partner has declined.  Educational expansion 
rather than changing mating patterns is responsible for the increasing number of 
highly educated couples.  At the same time, homogenous couples with low education 
present a relatively constant population share (around 8% of the total population), 
but this type of assortative mating has become more pronounced over time.  Low 
educated individuals have become a more segregated group in terms of marital 
patterns and this might expose them to a higher social and economic vulnerability. 
This evidence deserves further investigation in future studies.  We have also found 
that the probability to remain single has declined in particular for tertiary educated 
individuals and most strongly for tertiary educated women.  
Even though assortative mating among tertiary educated individuals has 
declined over time, this does not imply that assortative mating in hourly wages has 
15 Results are similar when the age group of the women rather than the man is used.
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also weakened in the upper part of the distribution.  Our second analysis has indeed 
shown that assortative mating in hourly wages has not only increased among low 
earners, but also among high earners.  For education, this suggests that individuals 
with a tertiary education degree have become more heterogeneous and that tertiary 
education alone has become a less selective characteristic for mating patterns.  The 
signalling effect of education in terms of socio-economic importance seems to have 
weakened, but other criteria of selectivity play an important role.  It remains an open 
question to establish to what extent selectivity has moved within tertiary education 
according to the type of university, the type of degree or the field of study.  
A difficulty for wage homogamy is that it reflects not only assortative mating, 
but also (labour-supply) decisions and adaptations taken during the relationship. 
Using information from the Swiss Household Panel and regression models, we have 
found that similarity in wages is the result of selection into couples rather than of 
influences between partners.  This conclusion is drawn from the fact wage homogamy 
declines over the duration of the relationship.  In addition to this, we have found 
that educational homogamy is associated with wage homogamy.  Couples where the 
woman married up show the highest wage gap within couples, and couples where 
the man married up show the lowest wage gap within couples.  Homogamous 
couples with tertiary education do not show a higher homogamy in earnings than 
other homogamous couples.  
Overall, economic homogeneity has important consequences for inequalities 
in society.  Shrinking inequalities within households might lead to rising inequalities 
between households.  With increased homogamy at the top and at the bottom of the 
distribution, we found support for wage polarisation.  Even if these results appear 
worrisome from the perspective of inequality at the societal level, further research 
shows that consequences of assortative mating in Switzerland are small and have 
not lead to rising income inequality (Kuhn and Ravazzini 2017).
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